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Irreconcilable Deferences? The
Troubled Marriage of Judicial Review
Standards under the Steelworkers




The Supreme Court's decision in 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett' should raise
new questions about judicial deference to arbitration awards. That ruling prec-
luded plaintiffs from suing in federal court under the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act (ADEA), and required them to arbitrate their age discrimination
claims by using the labor arbitration procedures in their collective bargaining
agreement.2 Until now, the Supreme Court has said that labor arbitration is uni-
quely suited to adjust disputes between unions and employers-but never has
labor arbitration been depicted as an appropriate forum for litigating employment
discrimination claims.
To explore the ramifications of this hybrid, labor-employment discrimination
award, I ask what standards would a court apply to review an arbitrator's ruling.
The Steelworker's Trilogy-three Supreme Court decisions that explain to courts
how to review awards under section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations
Act-pronounce deferential standards.3 But until now, individual employment
awards have typically been reviewed under section 10 of the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA) or state law equivalents. My research on labor awards and individual
employment awards show that courts do not behave the same under these different
regimes. They enforce about seventy-two percent of labor awards, but as much as
ninety-two percent of employment discrimination awards. Posing a hypothetical
example from the Court's recent affirmative action decision, Ricci v. DeStefano,4 1
assess Penn Plaza's potential impact on this new method for adjudicating discrim-
ination claims.
* Professor, School of Labor and Employment Relations, and College of Law, University of Illi-
nois at Urbana-Champaign. Prof. LeRoy gratefully acknowledges the research contribution of Profes-
sor Rafael Gely, who collected and analyzed data for Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, The Steel-
workers Trilogy and Grievance Arbitration Appeals: How the Federal Courts Respond, 13 INDUS.
REL. L.J. 78 (1992). These data form part of the research findings that I report here.
1. 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009).
2. Id. at 1474.
3. See United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 664 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior
& Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 563
U.S. 593 (1960).
4. 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
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1. INTRODUCTION
A. The Research Question
The Supreme Court's decisions in 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett? and Ricci v.
DeStefano6 raise new questions about judicial deference to arbitration awards.
These landmark cases set the stage for our research question: do courts equally
defer to arbitration awards under the Federal Arbitration Act and the Labor-
Management Relations Act's (LMRA's) counterpart, the Steelworkers Trilogy?
In Penn Plaza, a union entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA)
that required individual employees to submit discrimination claims to arbitration.7
Steven Pyett and co-workers filed a grievance that alleged violations of the CBA
when their jobs as security guards were sub-contracted. Separately, they filed an
age discrimination lawsuit in federal district court.9  Their employer moved to
compel arbitration of this claim, but the court denied the motion.' Eventually, the
Supreme Court ruled that Steven Pyett was precluded from suing his employer
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)." His only recourse,
therefore, was to arbitrate his claim under the conditions set forth in the CBA.12
The Penn Plaza decision failed to appreciate a long-simmering tension be-
tween employment arbitration that occurs under the FAA' 3 and labor arbitrations
that occur under section 301 of the LMRA.14 The FAA authorizes courts to en-
force arbitration agreements.15  Also, it provides courts authority to confirm or
5. 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009).
6. 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
7. 14 Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1461. The non-discrimination clause also provided for arbitration,
stating:
§ 30 NO DISCRIMINATION. There shall be no discrimination against any present or future em-
ployee by reason of race, creed, color, age, disability, national origin, sex, union membership, or
any other characteristic protected by law, including, but not limited to, claims made pursuant to
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, the New York City Human Rights
Code, . . . or any other similar laws, rules, or regulations. All such claims shall be subject to the
grievance and arbitration procedures (Articles V and VI) as the sole and exclusive remedy for vi-
olations. Arbitrators shall apply appropriate law in rendering decisions based upon claims of dis-
crimination.
Id. at 1461.
In conjunction with this provision, Art. VI of the CBA said that the arbitrator 'shall . . . decide all
differences arising between the parties as to interpretation, application or performance of any part of
this Agreement and such other issues as the parties are expressly required to arbitrate before him under
the terms of this Agreement."' Id. at 1461, n.1.
8. Id. at 1462.
9. Pyett v. Pa. Bldg. Co., No. 04-CV-7536(NRB), 2006 WL 1520517 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
10. 14 Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1462-63.
11. Id. at 1474.
12. Id. at 1461. In conjunction with non-discrimination clause in supra note 3, pt. VI of the CBA
said that the arbitrator "'shall ... decide all differences arising between the parties as to interpretation,
application or performance of any part of this Agreement and such other issues as the parties are ex-
pressly required to arbitrate before him under the terms of this Agreement."' Id. at 1461 & n.1.
13. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).
14. Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (2006).
15. The FAA provides court's jurisdiction to stay actions where there is a dispute that is subject to
an arbitration agreement. 9 U.S.C. § 3. The FAA also authorizes federal courts to compel arbitration
where one party to an arbitration agreement refuses to submit a claim to that forum. 9 U.S.C. § 4.
90 [Vol. 2010
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vacate arbitration awards.' 6 By specifying narrow grounds for reviewing awards,
the FAA promotes judicial deference to the procedures and outcomes of this pri-
vate alternative dispute resolution (ADR) process.' 7
The LMRA takes a similar approach in deferring to arbitration, but the statute
itself is much less specific. It simply provides federal jurisdiction to enforce col-
lective bargaining agreements, including arbitration clauses in these contracts.'8
Addressing this statutory void, the U.S. Supreme Court has provided standards for
enforcing arbitration agreements and arbitrator awards. In the Steelworkers Trilo-
gy, the U.S. Supreme Court authorized lower courts to compel arbitration of
grievances.' 9 Also, the Trilogy broadly stated a judicial policy to defer to the
judgment of arbitrators. This was accomplished by setting forth limited grounds
for vacating awards.20
I suggest that the two arbitration regimes, while superficially similar, operate
quite differently. In particular, courts do not behave with the same deference to
arbitration awards under the FAA and LMRA. And therein is a new problem that
Penn Plaza created. On the one hand, the majority opinion confidently asserted
that Steven Pyett is still protected by federal courts, even though his claim will be
decided by an arbitrator:
[A]n arbitrator's decision as to whether a unionized employee has been
discriminated against on the basis of age in violation of the ADEA re-
mains subject to judicial review under the FAA. "[Allthough judicial
scrutiny of arbitration awards necessarily is limited, such review is suffi-
cient to ensure that arbitrators comply with the requirements of the sta-
tute." 21
This is true in theory. But what if empirical evidence shows that federal
courts virtually rubber stamp awards under the FAA, but vacate labor arbitration
awards more frequently? What if statistics show that state courts vacate FAA
awards more much often than federal counterparts? In the face of such inconsis-
tency, would Penn Plaza still be justified in concluding that judicial scrutiny of
arbitration awards is sufficient to ensure that the arbitrator has complied with the
requirements of the ADEA? And on what authority does the Court believe that
Mr. Pyett's award is reviewable under the FAA and not the LMRA? After all, his
arbitration procedure is specified in a CBA that is subject to LMRA regulation.
I examine a contradiction in Penn Plaza. The Court assumes that the individ-
ual claimant would challenge an adverse award under the FAA-but if the arbitra-
tion occurred under the auspices of a CBA, the resulting award presumably would
be subject to LMRA review and its separate standards under the Steelworkers
16. 9 U.S.C. § 10.
17. Id.
18. 29 U.S.C. § 185.
19. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) (ruling that
a federal court may compel an employer to submit a union's grievance to arbitration); United Steel-
workers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel &
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
20. See 9 U.S.C. § 10; see also infra note 39.
21. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1471 n.10 (2009) (citation omitted) (quoting She-
arson/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987)).
No. 1] Irreconcilable Deferences 91
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Trilogy.22 Penn Plaza created a new FAA-LMRA hybrid arbitration and, with it,
an unsettled award-review conundrum.
In this study, I explore the empirical implications of this emerging controver-
sy.
B. Factual Context for My Study
I pursue my research question by creating two hypothetical scenarios that
draw from the Supreme Court's recent landmark ruling in Ricci.23 In Ricci, New
Haven, Connecticut and its firefighters union negotiated a policy for promotional
testing.24 The city administered a promotion test for firefighters that was devel-
oped by a consulting firm. The test resulted in no African-Americans qualifying
for promotion.26 If the city accepted the test results, only white firefighters would
be promoted.2" Concerned that the test would have an adverse impact on minority
firefighters, the City's Civil Service Board refused to certify the test results.28 As
a result, white firefighters who were denied a promotion sued New Haven under
Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause, claiming that the city unlawfully based
its decision on their race.29 Eventually, a federal district court dismissed their
discrimination claims. 30
To explore our research question, I pose two promotional disputes similar to
the Ricci case. In the LMRA (Steelworkers Trilogy) hypothetical, white union
members would be disqualified for promotion in an identical fact pattern. But
under Penn Plaza, they would submit their discrimination claim to a labor arbitra-
tor. The FAA hypothetical would pose the same facts but arise in a non-union
workplace. Thus, the arbitration would proceed under the FAA.
I further suppose that the labor arbitrator and employment arbitrator would
decide the discrimination exactly like the district court judge in Ricci's promo-
tional case. Both arbitrators would deny the grievances. The white firefighters
would then sue to vacate the awards.
Using my large databases on labor and employment arbitration awards, 31 1 es-
timate the probability that the firefighters would persuade courts to vacate awards
22. Originally, the grievance contained complaints that the Company violated the seniority provi-
sions of the CBA, and also the Age Discrimination in Employment Act; but after the initial arbitration
hearing, the union withdrew the ADEA claim. Id. at 1462. After Mr. Pyett filed an ADEA lawsuit, the
company unsuccessfully sought a court order to arbitrate his claim. Id. at 1463. In dictum, the Su-
preme Court observed that if an arbitration occurred and resulted in an award, it would be reviewed
under the FAA (emphasis added). Id. at 1471 n.10. But this unnecessary leap to decide a non-issue in
the case overlooked the possibility that a union could proceed with both a labor and an age discrimina-
tion grievance, as the union in this case originally acted. If an award had been issued on both types of
claims, and was subsequently challenged in federal court, logic would dictate that the award would be
reviewable under the Trilogy. This is because the entire arbitration proceeding would occur under
auspices of the collective bargaining agreement-an area specifically regulated by the Trilogy.
23. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
24. Id. at 2665.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 2666.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 2671.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 2671-72.
31. See infra notes 96-98, citing published articles that report on these databases.
[Vol. 201092
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under the Trilogy and also under the FAA. I also compare their likelihood of
overturning the awards in state and federal courts. My data suggest that the odds
of vacating these awards would significantly differ under these seemingly similar
award review regimes.
The foregoing discussion sets the stage for our research question: do courts
equally defer to arbitration awards under the FAA and the LMRA? Before pro-
ceeding to the empirical analysis, I examine in more detail the award reviewing
standards in the FAA and LMRA.
II. DIFFERENCES IN DEFERENCE: FEDERAL COURT REVIEW OF
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR ARBITRATION AWARDS
A. The FAA: A Statutory Approach to Individual
Employment Arbitration
When Congress enacted the FAA, it meant to end judicial hostility to arbitra-
tion agreements. 32 Lawmakers wanted to prevent courts from intervening in pri-
vate disputes before or during the arbitration. 33 But they gave little thought to
post-arbitration disputes where a losing party refuses to comply with an award or
seeks to overturn the arbitrator's ruling in court.34 The 1924 Senate report said
that "courts are bound to accept and enforce the award of the arbitrators unless
there is in it a defect so inherently vicious that, as a matter of common morality, it
ought not to be enforced."35 An award should be vacated "only when corruption,
partiality, fraud or misconduct are present or when the arbitrators exceeded or
imperfectly executed their powers or were influenced by other undue means-
cases in which enforcement would obviously be unjust."36 The Senate concluded
that "[t]here is no authority and no opportunity for the court, in connection with
the award, to inject its own ideas of what the award should have been." 37
32. The Senate Report said that the bill would abolish the judicial reluctance to enforce arbitration
agreements. S. REP. No. 68-536, at 2-3 (1924). During Senate debate on the FAA, Senator Thomas J.
Walsh, explained: "In short, the bill provides for the abolition of the rule that agreements for arbitra-
tion will not be specifically enforced." Remarks of Senator Walsh, 66 CONG. REC. 984 (1924).
33. Joint Hearings before the Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary, 68th Cong.1st
Sess, on S. 1005 and H.R. 646, at 6 (1924). Julius Henry Cohen, General Counsel of the New York
State Chamber of Commerce said, "The difficulty is that men do enter into these such (arbitration)
agreements and then afterwards repudiate the agreement.... You go in and watch the expression of
the face of your arbitrator and you have a 'hunch' that he is against you, and you withdraw and say, 'I
do not believe in arbitration anymore."' Id.
34. H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 2. The FAA's brief legislative history said: "The award may then be
entered as a judgment, subject to attack by the other party for fraud and corruption and similar undue
influence, or for palpable error in form."
35. S. REP. No. 68-536, supra note 32, at 4, stating:
The courts are bound to accept and enforce the award of the arbitrators unless there is in it a de-
fect so inherently vicious that, as a matter of common morality, it ought not to be enforced. This
exists only when corruption, partiality, fraud or misconduct are present or when the arbitrators
exceeded or imperfectly executed their powers or were influenced by other undue means- cases
in which enforcement would obviously be unjust. There is no authority and no opportunity for
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A lawyer's brief on common law vacatur provided the main outline for judi-
cial reviewing standards in the FAA, and now appears in section 10 of the Act.39
Contemporary courts believe that these grounds are strikingly narrow. 4
The first sub-part in section 10 of the FAA requires proof of arbitrator fraud
or corruption. 41 The second is similarly narrow, requiring proof of evident partial-
ity by the arbitrator.42 The third basis refers to unlikely events during the arbitra-
tion proceedings. A hearing must be scheduled, and a party must request a post-
ponement of the hearing. In addition, the arbitrator must refuse to grant the re-
quest for postponement. Assuming that these conditions occur, the party moving
to vacate an award must prove that the arbitrator was "guilty of misconduct in
refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown." 43 Similar to the
first two FAA provisions, vacatur depends on arbitrator misconduct. The other
basis in sub-section 3 requires proof that the arbitrator refused to hear evidence
pertinent and material to the controversy, or was guilty of other misbehavior that
prejudiced the rights of a party." The fourth and final ground is the broadest,
since it refers to arbitrator judgment and discretion.45 A court may vacate an
award where arbitrators exceeded their powers, or the award is so indefinite that it
is imperfectly executed.46
Important to note, the FAA is supplemented by parallel legislation in thirty-
five states that adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA) and fourteen other
states that enacted similar legislation. 47 Many state laws contain the four statutory
standards in section 10 of the FAA, and add a fifth basis to vacate an award.48
38. See Joint Hearings before the Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 1st
Sess, on S. 1005 and H.R. 646, at 36 (1924) (Statement of W.W. Nichols, January 9, 1924). The legis-
lative reports and debates said nothing as to whether post-award and state court litigation rules should
be preempted by the new federal law.
39. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006), authorizing courts to vacate an award:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) where there was evident
partiality or corruption by the arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of
misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of
any party have been prejudiced; or (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
40. See, e.g., Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Judicial
review of arbitration awards is tightly limited; perhaps it ought not be called 'review' at all.").
41. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1).
42. Id. § 10(a)(2).
43. Id. § 10(a)(3).
44. Id.
45. Id. § 10(a)(4).
46. Id.
47. REVISED UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT, Prefatory Note (2000); 7 U.L.A. 2 (Supp. 2005), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/uarba/arbitrat1213.htm.
48. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 12 (1955), 7 U.L.A. 280 (1997), available at
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=29567. The Act states:
(a) Upon application of a party, the court shall vacate an award where: (1) The award was pro-
cured by corruption, fraud or other undue means; (2) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator
appointed as a neutral or corruption in any of the arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the rights
of any party; (3) The arbitrators exceeded their powers; (4) The arbitrators refused to postpone
the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefore or refused to hear evidence material to
the controversy or otherwise so conducted the hearing, contrary to the provisions of Section 5, as
to prejudice substantially the rights of a party; or (5) There was no arbitration agreement and the
issue was not adversely determined in proceedings under Section 2 and the party did not partici-
94 [Vol. 2010
6
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2010, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2010/iss1/5
Irreconcilable Deferences
This fairly uniform approach began to fragment after 2000, when a national
panel of experts approved the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA). The
RUAA drafters identified fourteen issues that required updating in contemporary
arbitration.49
In a recent survey of all state laws, the American Arbitration Association re-
ported that twelve states adopted the RUAA.50  The revised vacatur standards
appear in the RUAA's section 23.5' By regulating arbitrations in more detail,
these provisions supply award losers with more ammunition to challenge awards.
pate in the arbitration hearing without raising the objection; but the fact that the relief was such
that it could not or would not be granted by a court of law or equity is not ground for vacating or
refusing to confirm the award.
Id.
UNIF. ARIBTRATION ACT vacatur standards appear in ALASKA STAT. § 09.43.120 (2009); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 12-1512 (2009); ARK. CODE § 16-108-212 (2009); IDAHO CODE § 7-912 (2009); 710 ILL COMP.
STAT. § 5/12 (WEST 2009); IND. CODE § 34-57-2-13 (2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-412 (2009); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 417.160 (WEST 2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 14, § 5938 (2009). MASS. GEN.
LAWS CH 150, § 12 (2009); MINN. STAT. § 572.19 (2009); MO. REV. STAT. § 435.405 (2009); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 27-5-312 (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2613 (2009); S.C. CODE ANN. §15-48-130
(2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-25A-24 (2009); TENN CODE ANN. § 29-5-213 (2009); VA. CODE
ANN § 8.01-581-010 (2009). See supra note 39.
49. The RUAA list includes:
(1) who decides the arbitrability of a dispute and by what criteria; (2) whether a court or arbitra-
tors may issue provisional remedies; (3) how a party can initiate an arbitration proceeding; (4)
whether arbitration proceedings may be consolidated; (5) whether arbitrators are required to dis-
close facts reasonably likely to affect impartiality; (6) what extent arbitrators or an arbitration or-
ganization are immune from civil actions; (7) whether arbitrators or representatives of arbitration
organizations may be required to testify in another proceeding; (8) whether arbitrators have the
discretion to order discovery, issue protective orders, decide motions for summary dispositions,
hold pre-hearing conferences and otherwise manage the arbitration process; (9) when a court may
enforce a pre-award ruling by an arbitrator; (10) what remedies an arbitrator may award, espe-
cially in regard to attorney's fees, punitive damages or other exemplary relief; (11) when a court
can award attorney's fees and costs to arbitrators and arbitration organizations; (12) when a court
can award attorney's fees and costs to a prevailing party in an appeal of an arbitrator's award; and
(13) which sections of the UAA would not be waivable; particularly when one party has signifi-
cantly less bargaining power than another; and (14) the use of electronic information in the arbi-
tration process.
REVISED UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT, Prefatory Note.
50. See RUAA and UMA Legislation from Coast to Coast, DISP. RESOL. TIMES, Aug. 31. 2005,
available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=26600. The states are Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, Nevada,
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, and Washington.
Id.
51. REVISED UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 23, 7 U.L.A. 2 (Supp. 2005), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edulbll/ulc/uarba/arbitratl213.htm.. The revised vacatur standards, appearing in
RUAA Section 23, added a sixth element, and made other changes in its incorporation of the four FAA
standards and the fifth standard in the UAA. In reproducing the vacatur provision, I italicize all addi-
tions to section 10 of the FAA; and italicize and underline additions to section 12 of the UAA. I do this
to support my point that vacatur standards are proliferating, thereby creating more ammunition for
award-losers to appeal the arbitration outcome.
SECTION 23. VACATING AWARD.
(a) Upon [motion] to the court by a party to an arbitration proceeding, the court shall vacate an
award made in the arbitration proceeding if: (1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or
other undue means; (2) there was: (A) evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral
arbitrator, (B) corruption by an arbitrator; or (C) misconduct by an arbitrator prejudicing the
rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding; (3) an arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing
upon showing of sufficient cause for postponement, refused to consider evidence material to the
controversy, or otherwise conducted the hearing contrary to Section 15, so as to prejudice sub-
stantially the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding; (4) an arbitrator exceeded the arbitra-
No. 1]1 95
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The FAA picture is further complicated by federal court adoption of common
law standards to review awards. Thus, some courts supplement section 10 review-
ing standards with their own yardsticks. "Manifest disregard of the law" is a
prime example.52 Federal circuit courts are divided in their use of this standard.53
Occasionally, courts use manifest disregard of the law to vacate awards.54 The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit explained in Halligan v. Piper Jaf-
fray, Inc. that arbitrators cannot "ignore[] the law or the evidence or both."55 In
contrast, the Seventh Circuit cast doubt on this standard.
State courts have also supplemented statutory standards by vacating awards
that are irrational.57 When applied to multi-million dollar awards in employment
arbitrations, 8 this standard imports the Supreme Court's regulation of jury awards
in civil trials. 59
Although Congress envisioned the FAA as a commercial arbitration law, the
Supreme Court expanded the law's usage when it approved mandatory arbitration
for an age discrimination claim in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.6
Gilmer ruled that a securities industry employee who had been required to sign an
arbitration agreement was precluded from suing in court.61 This ruling caused
62
many employers to require individual workers to agree to arbitration.
tor's powers; (5) there was no agreement to arbitrate, unless the person participated in the arbi-
tration proceeding without raising the objection under Section 15(c) not later than the beginning
of the arbitration hearing; or (6) the arbitration was conducted without proper notice of the init-
iation of an arbitration as required in Section 9 so as to preiudice substantially the rights of a
party to the arbitration proceeding.
Id. (emphasis added).
52. E.g., LaPrade v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc., 246 F.3d 702, 706 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Kanuth v.
Prescott, Ball & Turben, Inc., 949 F.2d 1175, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
53. Numerous circuits have adopted this standard. E.g., Drayer v. Krasner, 572 F.2d 348, 352 (2d
Cir. 1978); Patten v. Signator Ins. Agency, Inc., 441 F.3d 230 (4th Cir. 2006); Prestige Ford v. Ford
Dealer Computer Svcs., Inc., 324 F.3d 391, 395 (5th Cir. 2003); Buchignani v. Vining Sparks IBG,
Inc., 208 F.3d 212 (6th Cir. 2000); Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1060
(9th Cir. 1991); Ainsworth v. Skurnick, 960 F.2d 939, 940-41 (llth Cir. 1992) (per curiam)).
54. E.g., DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., 983 F.Supp. 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). The court vacated the
panel's denial of attorney's fees because the arbitrators "appreciate[d] the existence of a clearly go-
verning legal principle but decide[d] to ignore or pay no attention to it." Id. at 464.
55. 148 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 1998).
56. Judge Posner noted, "We can understand neither the need for the formula nor the role that it
plays in judicial review of arbitration (we suspect none-that it is just words). If it is meant to smuggle
review for clear error in by the back door, it is inconsistent with the entire modern law of arbitration."
Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1994).
57. Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 754 N.Y.S.2d 264, 270 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) ("A grossly
excessive award that is arbitrary and irrational under Gore should be equally arbitrary and irrational
under the FAA.").
58. Id.
59. E.g., Lee v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 805, 809-10 (2d Cir. 1996) (court applied Gore factors in terms
of irrationality to an employment discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
60. 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991).
61. Id. at 35.
62. See Ken May, Arbitration: Attorney Urges Employers to Adopt Mandatory Programs as Risk-
Management, 93 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at A-5 (May 14, 2001) (reporting an employment lawyer's
view that mandatory arbitration helps employers limit damages and eliminate class action lawsuits).
David Copus also notes that the biggest financial risk for employers in termination lawsuits-tort
claims in which a single plaintiff can be awarded millions of dollars-is controlled by arbitration
agreements that cap damages. See also U.S. General Accounting Office, Employment Discrimination:
Most Private Sector Employers Use Alternative Dispute Resolution, GAO/HEHS-95-150 at 5 (July 5,
96 [Vol. 2010
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In theoretical terms, Gilmer broadly approved arbitration as a substitute for
trials, concluding that by "agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party [would]
not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute . . . ."63 Thus, Gilmer
stated a theory of forum substitution where arbitrators serve as substitute judges,
subject to the narrow reviewing standards that courts apply to disputed awards.
More recently, the Court's ruling in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams expanded
Gilmer by limiting a section in the FAA that excludes the employment contracts
of employees in railroad, maritime, and closely related industries.64 For these
workers, their arbitration agreements are not enforceable under the FAA-and this
implies that they are not subject to mandatory arbitration, but may instead seek
recourse in court. But Circuit City means that all other employees who have a
contract that calls for arbitration must submit their dispute to that forum.
B. The LMRA: A Federal Common Law Approach under
the Steelworkers Trilogy
By the late 1940s and 1950s, the FAA's coverage expanded to review a dif-
ferent kind of workplace arbitration award-those involving grievances filed by
unions against employers. When award-enforcement disputes arose in unionized
settings, some courts applied the FAA to arbitration clauses in labor agreements.66
Other courts took a different tack in these disputes. Congress passed the LMRA
in 1947 to curb a rising tide of strikes. 67 Section 301 created federal jurisdiction
to enforce CBAs.
The LMRA, therefore, created a confusing overlap between its own section
301 and the FAA. The legislative history of the FAA strongly suggests that the
1995) available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1995/he95150.pdf (reporting that employers prefer
alternative dispute resolution forums to court because of growing concerns about "(1) million dollar
jury awards to employees and (2) the provision in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 that permits punitive
damages in cases of intentional discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
Americans With Disabilities Act."
63. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
64. 532 U.S. 105, 114-19 (2001) (ruling that all employment arbitration agreements are enforceable
under the FAA, except a relatively small segment of agreements that cover transportation workers.)
65. For background, see Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM.
L. REV. 157 (1953); Donald Wollett & Harry H. Wellington, Federalism and Breach of the Labor
Agreement, 7 STAN. L. REV. 445 (1955); and Alexander M. Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, Legislative
Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. I (1957).
66. E.g., Local 205, United Electrical Workers v. Gen. Elec. Co., 233 F.2d 85 (1st Cir. 1956).
67. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 453 (1957) (stating that "Congress
was also interested in promoting collective bargaining that ended with agreements not to strike"); see
also BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULLETIN NO. 916, HANDBOOK OF LABOR
STATISTICS 136 tbl. E-3, col. 2 (1948) (Extent of Work Stoppages, 1916-47). Strikes rose sharply from
2,772 in 1938, 2,613 in 1939, 2,508 in 1940, 4,288 in 1941, 2,968 in 1942, and 3,752 in 1943 to 4,956
in 1944, 4,750 in 1945, and 4,985 in 1946. Id.
68. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2006) states:
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing
employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such la-
bor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of
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law was created to help companies resolve commercial and maritime disputes.69
In contrast, section 301 of the LMRA was enacted specifically to deal with labor
disputes. The contours of LMRA jurisdiction were hard to discern, however,
because Congress said nothing about court standards for reviewing labor arbitra-
tion awards.
The Supreme Court waded into this thicket in Textile Workers Union v. Lin-
coln Mills70 by approving the development of federal common law contract prin-
ciples under section 301. A short time later, the Court issued three closely related
decisions, now called the Steelworkers Trilogy, which set forth standards for en-
forcing labor arbitration agreements.
One Trilogy decision, United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel &
Car Corp.,7 1 specified limited grounds for vacating an arbitrator's ruling: (1) the
award fails to draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement, 72 or (2)
the arbitrator exceeds his authority. 73 In a companion Trilogy decision, the Court
presumed that the arbitrator has special insight into workplace disputes. 74 Thus,
the Trilogy sent a strong message to federal courts to enforce awards. This ap-
proach was called into question, however, as labor arbitration awards touched on
subjects that were regulated by public policies that transcended union-
management relations.
For example, employment discrimination laws provided a notable complica-
tion for labor arbitration. Consider the dilemma that confronted an employer
who needed to lay off part of its workforce. The employer could comply with the
69. S. REP. No. 68-536, supra note 32, at 2 (stating that the FAA was proposed to help businesses
avoid "the delay and expenses of litigation"); H.R. REP. No. 68-96, supra note 34, at 2 (showing that
Congress believed the simplicity of arbitration would "reduce[e] technicality, delay, and [keep] ex-
pense to a minimum and at the same time safeguard the rights of the parties").
70. 353 U.S. 448 (1957). The Court ruled that federal jurisdiction to enforce collective bargaining
agreements under the National Labor Relations Act, including arbitration provisions, arises under
section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, and not the FAA. Id. at 451-52
71. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
72. Id. at 597. The Court explained that the arbitrator's award "is legitimate only so long as it draws
its essence from the collective bargaining agreement." Id. When the arbitrator dispenses "his own
brand of industrial justice" contrary to the agreement, the "courts have no choice but to refuse en-
forcement of the award." Id.
73. Id. at 598. An award should not be disturbed unless the arbitrator "has abused the trust the par-
ties confided in him and has not stayed within the areas marked out for his consideration." Id. A court
should not vacate an award merely because it disagrees with the arbitrator's construction of the agree-
ment. Id. It added that a "mere ambiguity in the opinion accompanying an award, which permits the
inference that the arbitrator may have exceeded his authority, is not a reason for refusing to enforce the
award. Arbitrators have no obligation to the court to give their reasons for an award." Id. at 597.
74. .United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82 (1960).
The Court explained:
The parties expect that his judgment of a particular grievance will reflect not only what the con-
tract says but, insofar as the collective bargaining agreement permits, such factors as the effect
upon productivity of a particular result, its consequence to the morale of the shop, his judgment
whether tensions will be heightened or diminished. .... The ablest judge cannot be expected to
bring the same experience and competence to bear upon the determination of a grievance, be-
cause he cannot be similarly informed.
Id. at 582.
75. A prescient insight to this problem appears in David E. Feller, The Coming End of Arbitration's
Golden Age, 29 PRoc. NAT'L. ACAD. ARB. 109 (1997) (stating: "Arbitration is not an independent
force, but a dependent variable, and to the extent that collective bargaining is diminished as a source of
employee rights, arbitration is equally diminished.").
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CBA, and therefore sequence layoffs in reverse seniority order. Consequently,
white men would be retained while lower seniority minorities and women would
be laid-off. Or, the employer could comply with a consent decree resulting from a
race and sex discrimination lawsuit with its minority employees and ignore the
layoff sequence in the CBA.
The employer in W. R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of Unit-
ed Rubber Workers faced this hard choice and complied with a court decree in
order to avoid a discrimination lawsuit.76 But the arbitrator, whose authority was
grounded only in the CBA, ruled that the company violated the CBA by not fol-
lowing the agreement's prescribed order for laying off workers.77 After the em-
ployer refused to comply with the award, the Supreme Court in W.R. Grace
upheld the arbitrator's ruling.
In doing so, the Court stated an additional common law standard for review-
ing awards. The award cannot violate a public policy. But the W. R. Grace Court
applied the standard carefully to circumstances where "the contract as interpreted
by [the arbitrator] violates some explicit public policy."78 Before a court vacates
any award, a judge must, therefore, find that a public policy is "well-defined and
dominant, and is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents
and not from general considerations of supposed public interests."79
Before long, other public policies tempted courts to vacate arbitration awards.
Drug use was regulated by criminal law. If an arbitrator reinstated an operator of
an industrial cutting machine who was fired for possessing drugs on an employ-
er's property, the award would be at odds with drug laws. On the other hand,
nothing in these laws specifically prohibited the employment of a worker who was
arrested on drug charges.
This was the problem presented in United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco,
Inc. 0 The Court reinforced the message that judges should avoid vacating awards
76. 461 U.S. 757 (1983). The employer had entered into a consent decree with the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission that required the company to maintain its extant proportion of women
and blacks in the work force in the event of layoffs to remedy past sex and race discrimination at its
Corinth, Mississippi plant. Id. at 759-60. A year after entering into the decree, the employer needed to
lay off part of its work force and, consistent with the decree, protected females and minorities by
laying off white males. Id. at 761-62. Having more seniority than the protected employees, the white
males filed a grievance to vindicate this contractual right. Id. After being compelled by federal courts
to arbitrate this grievance, the company lost at arbitration. Id. at 763-64.
77. Id. at 762-64. The arbitrator ruled that the employer had breached the collective bargaining
agreement, in opposition to the consent decree, and awarded the affected employees damages rather
than reinstatement. Id. at 768-69.
78. Id. at 766.
79. Id. (quotation omitted).
80. 484 U.S. 29 (1987). In this case, an arbitrator reinstated a paper mill worker who was fired after
he was arrested in the company parking lot on a drug charge. Id. at 33. The district court vacated the
award because the judge believed that reinstatement would violate a public policy against operating
dangerous machinery by drug-users. Id. at 34-35. Misco reversed these rulings. In doing so, it articu-
lated an additional Trilogy principle for denying enforcement to an award-albeit a narrow basis-
when it said that an award may be set aside only if they "would violate some explicit public policy that
is well-defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained by reference to laws and legal precedents and
not from general considerations of supposed public interests." Id. at 43 (internal quotations and cita-
tions omitted).
Misco did more than reaffirm the Trilogy. The decision dealt explicitly with two other grounds that
lower courts use to review awards. In effect, Misco enlarged upon the Trilogy's broad ranging consid-
eration of grounds for vacating arbitration awards, but also stressed that judges are to confirm awards
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on general public policy grounds.8' It told judges to leave the fact-finding func-
tion entirely to the arbitrator, except in extremely rare instances where arbitrator
fraud or other serious misconduct is evident. 82 Misco emphasized this point, stat-
ing: "Courts thus do not sit to hear claims of factual or legal error by an arbitrator
as an appellate court does in reviewing decisions of lower courts."83  Still, after
Misco, some federal courts did not get the message to leave awards alone except
in very rare instances. This prompted the Supreme Court on two more recent
occasions to rebuke wayward judges.84
C. Theoretical Comparison of Award Review under the FAA and LAfRA
I return to my research question: do courts equally defer to arbitration awards
under the FAA and the LMRA's counterpart in the Steelworkers Trilogy? I do not
yet answer this question with data, but summarize the foregoing discussion by
noting some important theoretical differences in these award review regimes.
Table I summarizes these points. I note that the FAA was enacted as a re-
sponse to business concerns about the growing costs of civil litigation. Congress
even when they disagree with the arbitrator's ruling or reasoning. See also id. at 39 (stating "decisions
procured by the parties through fraud or through the arbitrator's dishonesty need not be enforced" but
awards that suffer from serious errors are to be enforced "as long as the arbitrator is even arguably
construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority" even if "a court is
convinced the arbitrator committed serious error.").
81. Id. at 44 (stating 'general considerations of supposed public interests' is not the sort that per-
mits a court to set aside an arbitration award that was entered in accordance with a valid collective-
bargaining agreement." (citation omitted)).
82. Misco stated a nearly absolute rule against reviewing an arbitrator's fact-findings: When "only
improvident, [or] even silly, factfinding is claimed ... [tlhis is hardly a sufficient basis for disregard-
ing what the agent appointed by the parties determined to be the historical facts." Id. at 39. The Court
elaborated:
Even in the very rare instances when an arbitrator's procedural aberrations rise to the level of af-
firmative misconduct, as a rule the court must not foreclose further proceedings by settling the
merits according to its own judgment of the appropriate result, since this step would improperly
substitute a judicial determination for the arbitrator's decision that the parties bargained for in the
collective-bargaining agreement. Instead, the court should simply vacate the award, thus leaving
open the possibility of further proceedings if they are permitted under the terms of the agreement.
The court also has the authority to remand for further proceedings when this step seems appropri-
ate.
Id. at 38.
83. Id. at 44. ("As we see it, the formulation of public policy set out by the Court of Appeals did not
comply with the statement that such a policy must be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal
precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests.") (internal quotes omit-
ted).
84. See Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 531 U.S. 57 (2000); Major League
Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504 (2001).
85. Joint Hearings before the Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary, supra note 33, at 6
(1924) (Statement of Charles L. Bernheimer, Chairman of Committee on Arbitration). Mr. Bernheimer
stated:
I have made a study of the question of arbitration ever since the panic of 1907. The difficulties mer-
chants then met with, that of having repudiations and other business troubles, resulting in much loss
and expense outside of the costly and ruinous litigation, caused me to start on a study of the subject of
arbitration, and the deeper I got into it the more I was convinced we should have legislation in State
and Nation that would make arbitration a reality, that would cause an agreement or contract in writing
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heard from business leaders about their growing entanglements in courts, and
sought to provide businesses a legally enforceable method to privately adjudicate
their disputes. Lawmakers believed that arbitration provided businesses a simp-
ler, faster, and less expensive alternative to court adjudication.87 They also per-
ceived that courts were hostile to arbitration, and therefore sought two new roles
for courts-to enforce arbitration agreements by ordering arbitration in place of
trials, and to review awards narrowly so as to allow the parties to fulfill their arbi-
tration bargain.
More recently, the FAA has undergone a unique "back door" revision. While
the FAA has not been significantly amended, its implementation has been affected
by the fact that states have concurrent jurisdiction in FAA proceedings." Thus, if
state vacatur standards change, this amounts to a "back door" alteration in FAA
reviewing standards. In this vein, it is important to note that some states have
enacted the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act-a statutory revision that intends to
improve procedural fairness for parties who arbitrate their disputes.9
Table 1. The FAA (Section 10) and LMRA (Section 301)
Comparing Award Review Standards
FAA LMRA
Purpose * Respond to Business Concerns Promote Industrial
* Reduce Litigation Expense Peace
* Expedite and Simplify * Substitute Arbitration
Adjudication of Disputes for Strikes During Term
* End Judicial Hostility to Arbitration of CBA
Regulatory * Mostly Statutory * Promote Industrial
Method Peace
* Substitute Arbitration
for Strikes During Term
of CBA
Venue and * Federal or State Court * Entirely Common
Jurisdiction Law
86. See S. REP. 68-356, supra note 32.
87. Id. at 2 (stating that the FAA was proposed to help businesses avoid "the delay and expenses of
litigation"); H.R. REP. No. 68-96, supra note 34, at 2 (showing that Congress believed the simplicity of
arbitration would "reduce[e] technicality, delay, and [keep] expense to a minimum and at the same
time safeguard the rights of the parties").
88. The Supreme Court has repeatedly said that the FAA was enacted "to reverse the longstanding
judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed at English common law and had been
adopted by American courts." E.g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., Inc., 350 U.S. 198, 211 n.5
(1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-
20, 220 n. 6 (1985) (when Congress passed the FAA it was "motivated, first and foremost, by a con-
gressional desire" to reverse long-standing judicial resistance to arbitration). The Court made the same
point in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 n.4 (1974): "English courts traditionally
considered irrevocable arbitration agreements as 'ousting' the courts of jurisdiction, and refused to
enforce such agreements for this reason. This view was adopted by American courts as part of the
common law up to the time of the adoption of the Arbitration Act."
89. Infra note 107.
90. Supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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Recent * RUAA Standards (Year 2000) to * Federal Court
Change Improve Procedural Fairness
Judges * Federal (Appointed) * None
* State (Elected or Appointed)
In contrast, section 301 of the LMRA has not undergone any revision since its
enactment in 1947. I also observe that different circumstances led to the federal
law that regulates labor arbitration. The LMRA was enacted to promote industrial
peace and stability. Specifically, Congress wanted to minimize strikes while labor
agreements were in effect. 91 Unlike the FAA, the LMRA did not set forth specific
statutory standards for arbitration awards. Section 301 was a short and vague
declaration of policy to authorize courts to enforce labor agreements.92 Arbitra-
tion was brought into the realm of section 301 simply because Congress wanted to
fortify the use of arbitration clauses as strike substitutes.93 As more and more
disputes arose over arbitration awards, the federal courts had to decide whether to
review these private rulings under the FAA or invent their own common law stan-
dards for this purpose. The latter approach won out when the Supreme Court
decided the Trilogy.
In sum, the FAA and LMRA are strong public policies that favor arbitration.
This does not mean, however, that courts apply the same standards in reviewing
awards. Even if the standards were identical, one cannot be sure that a federal
judge and a state judge would be equally inclined to enforce an award. Federal
judges are nominated by the President and approved by the U.S. Senate. State
judges, in contrast, hold office by a variety of selection methods. 94 The fact that
some are elected may make these judges more sensitive to political pressures,
including campaign contributions. 95
III. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
In two earlier studies, I collected and analyzed data from federal court rulings
on labor arbitration awards (Rows 1-2, Tables 2A & 2B).9 6 These decisions oc-
curred from 1960-2001. In a more recent study, I added new labor arbitration
91. Supra note 67.
92. Supra note 68.
93. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 48 (1957).
94. Joanna M. Shepherd, The Influence of Retention Politics on Judges' Voting, 38 J. LEGAL STUD.
169, 181 (tbl. 2) (2009).
95. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (litigant before state supreme
justice had contributed $3 million to the judge's election fund, but judge refused to recuse himself
from case involving this contributor).
96. Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, The Steelworkers Trilogy and Grievance Arbitration Ap-
peals: How the Federal Courts Respond, 13 INDUs. REL. L.J. 78, 98 (1992). This research analyzed
federal district and appellate court decisions that resulted in a court order which compelled or denied
arbitration or which enforced or vacated an arbitrator's award in whole or in part. These decisions were
published after June 23, 1960 and before July 1, 1991. A follow-up study, Michael H. LeRoy & Peter
Feuille, Private Justice in the Shadow of Public Courts: The Autonomy of Workplace Arbitration
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cases from 2001 to 2006 (Row 3, Tables 2A and 2B). I turned my attention at
that point to creating a similar database for individual employment awards." The
sample had cases from 1975 through 2007 (Row 4, Tables 2A and 2B). For the
first time, I combine the labor and employment arbitration award data. Tables 2A
and 2B summarize these results. This presentation allows a direct comparison of
award review under the FAA and LMRA. Beneath the tables, I glean key findings
from this comparison.
Table 2A. Federal Court Confirmation of Awards: District Court Rulings
Year of LMRA: FAA:
Court Labor Arbitration Awards Employment Arbitration
Ruling Confirmation Ruling! Awards
Total Rulings Confirmation Ruling!
Total Rulings
1960-1991 724/1008........... 71.8% -
1991-2001 162/232... ....... 70.3% -
2001-2006 156/201............ 77.6% -
1975-2007 - 148/160............92.5%
TOTAL 1041/1441 ............ 72.3% 148/160.............92.5%
Table 2B. Federal Court Confirmation of Awards: Appellate Court Rulings
Year of LMRA: FAA:
Court Labor Arbitration Awards Employment Arbitration
Ruling Confirmation Ruling! Awards
Total Rulings Confirmation Ruling!
Total Rulings
1960-1991 301/427.... ....... 70.5%
1991-2001 77/116............................ 66.4%
2001-2006 61/80...... ...... 76.3%
1975-2007 - 70/83........ ...... 84.3%
TOTAL 439/623............70.5% 70/83........ ...... 84.3%
97. Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, Happily Never After: When Arbitration Has No Fairy Tale
Ending, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 199 (2006). This research extended the labor arbitration database
through 2006.
98. Michael H. LeRoy, Do Courts Create Moral Hazard? When Judges Nullify Employer Liability
in Arbitrations: An Empirical Analysis, 93 MINN. L. REV. 998 (2009).
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Table 3. Award Confirmation Rates by Federal and States Courts Using
FAA, Trilogy and Other Common Law Standards
Basis & Frequency for Challenging Laws vs. Difference in Confirmation Rates
* Corruption, Fraud, or Undue Means (FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 10(1), or State UAA
Equivalent)
Fed. District Ct. Ruling State First Court Ruling
7/7 (100%) 5/7 (71.4%)
Evident Partiality (FAA. 9 U.S.C. § 10(2), or State
Fed. District Ct. Ruling State First Court Ruling
25/25 (100%) 15/19 (78.9%)







Fed. District Ct. Ruling State First Court Ruling Difference
22/24 (91.7%) 10/13 (76.9%) 14.8% (Federal)
* Pc~d u rc r mn~f~ry Execute Award (FA A 9T USC S 10(4) or
S pxee ,or .r . .-f , Exct wr FA0"P Wtate UAA Equivalent)
Fed. District Ct. Ruling State First Court Ruling Difference
36/43 (90.7%) 17/30 (56.7%) 34.0% (Federal)
Manifest Disregard of the Law (FAA Common Law, Non-Trilogy)
Fed. District Ct. Ruling State First Court Ruling Difference
72/78 (92.3%) 15/19 (78.9%) 13.4% (Federal)
Irrational, Arbitrary and Capricious, or Gross Error (FAA Common Law,
Non-Triloov)
Fed. District Ct. Ruling State First Court Ruling Difference
17/17 (100%) 7/11 (63.6%) 36.4% (Federal)
* Punitive or Excessive (FAA Common Law, Non-Trilov)
Fed. District Ct. Ruling State First Court Ruling Difference
4/4 (100%) 4/6 (66.7%) 33.3% (Federal)
* Unconstitutional, Due Process (FAA Common Law, Non-Trilogy)
Fed. District Ct. Ruling State First Court Ruling Difference
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* Exceeds Authority (Common Law, Trilogy)
Fed. District Ct. Ruling State First Court Ruling Difference
7/9 (77.8%) 5/10 (50.0%) 27.8% (Federal)
* Essence of Agreement (Common Law. Trilogy)
Fed. District Ct. Ruling State First Court Ruling Difference
7/8 (87.5%) 2/4 (50.0%) 37.5% (Federal)
* Fact Finding (Common Law, Trilov)
Fed. District Ct. Ruling State First Court Ruling Difference
11/11 (100%) 11/14 (76.8%) 23.2% (Federal)
* Public Policy (Common Law, Trilogy)
Fed. District Ct. Ruling State First Court Ruling Difference
17/17 (100%) 20/26 (76.9%) 23.1% (Federal)
Finding I (Table 2). Federal courts confirm more individual employment
awards under the FAA than labor awards under the LMRA. In Table 2A, the
confirmation rate for district courts was 92.5% in individual employment arbitra-
tions under the FAA, compared to 72.3% for labor arbitrations. A similar but
smaller difference in confirmation rates was observed for federal appellate courts.
Table 2B shows that the confirmation rate under the FAA was 84.3%, compared
to 70.5% for the LMRA.
Finding 2 (Table 3). In individual employment disputes, federal courts con-
firmed employment awards under the FAA more often than state courts that used
identical standards under the Uniform Arbitration Act. The top four data rows of
data in Table 3 correspond to statutory standards in the FAA and closely related
state arbitration acts. In cases where the award was challenged on grounds of
alleged corruption, fraud, or procurement by undue means, federal courts con-
firmed 100% of awards, compared to confirmation of 71.4% in state court rulings.
Federal courts confirmed 100% of awards when a party claimed challenged the
arbitrator's ruling under the evident partiality standard.
State courts, in contrast, enforced only 78.9% of awards in cases where the
evident partiality issue was raised. The hearing misconduct argument-reflecting
another FAA and UAA vacatur standard-was rejected by twenty-two out of
twenty-four federal courts. Thus, the confirmation rate was 91.7%. State courts
vacated or modified three out of thirteen awards in which a party raised this argu-
ment, yielding a confirmation rate of 76.9%.
Finding 3 (Table 3). Award challengers most frequently argued that arbitra-
tors exceeded their powers. This argument often failed in federal courts, as judges
confirmed 90.7% of awards in forty-three cases. However, challengers enjoyed
remarkable success in state courts, where only 56.7% of awards (seventeen of
thirty cases) were confirmed.
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Finding 4 (Table 3). Not only were state courts less likely to confirm awards
than their federal counterparts, but their confirmation rates tended to fall even
more when they used common law rather than statutory standards. When challen-
gers argued that the award was irrational or arbitrary and capricious, state courts
upheld arbitrator rulings in only 63.6% of cases. The confirmation rate fell to
50% in cases involving a due process or constitutional challenge. I note, however,
that these cases were rare. Thus, these statistics may reflect the very small size of
the sub-sample.
Finding 5 (Table 3). Employment awards were occasionally challenged un-
der Trilogy standards, even though reviewing courts had jurisdiction under the
FAA or state-law equivalent. In these cases, courts were less likely to confirm
awards compared to challenges that were based solely on statutory grounds.
When a challenger cited the Trilogy standard that the arbitrator exceeded her au-
thority, they confirmed only 77.8% of cases. But when the nearly identical "ex-
ceeds powers" standard under the FAA was used, federal courts confirmed 90.7%
of awards. State courts confirmed only 76.9% of awards when a challenger made
a public policy argument under the Trilogy.
IV. CONCLUSION: PENN PLAZA ACCENTUATES DIFFERENCES
IN DEFERENCE
I return again to the research question: do courts equally defer to arbitration
awards under the FAA and the LMRA counterpart, the Steelworkers Trilogy?
This time, I answer the question with the data that are summarized in Table 4.
The statistics are derived from the findings for federal district courts and first-
level state courts that review awards.
Table 4. Federal Court Confirmation of Awards; Estimating the Probability
of Confirming a "Ricci" Award
Award Reviewed under Award Reviewed under
LMRA FAA
Federal District 72.3% 92.5%
Court
First-Level Not Studied 78.5%
State Court
To set the stage for analysis, I repeat my two hypothetical scenarios. In the
LMRA (Steelworkers Trilogy) hypothetical, white union members were disquali-
fied for promotion in a fact pattern that mirrored the Ricci case. Adhering to Penn
Plaza, they submitted their discrimination claim to an arbitrator appointed under
the provisions of the CBA. Like the district judge in Ricci, the arbitrator denied
the claim. The data in Table 4 suggest that the employer would have a 72.3%
chance of confirming the disputed award.
Turning to the FAA hypothetical, assume that the same dispute arose in a
non-union workplace. The arbitrator denied the complaint. If the award were
taken to state court for confirmation or vacatur, Table 4 suggests that there would
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be a 78.5% chance of upholding the arbitrator's ruling-six percentage points
more than the LMRA case.
However, if federal courts ruled on the award, there would be a 92.5% chance
of award confirmation. In other words, the probability of award enforcement by
federal courts would vary by more than twenty percentage points simply depend-
ing on whether the promotional arbitration arose under the LMRA or FAA. The
difference between federal and state confirmation rates under the FAA would be
fourteen percentage points.
I now examine the implications of these disparate outcomes.
A. Difference in Deference
In the course of reading more than 2,000 LMRA and FAA court rulings on
disputed arbitration awards in our previously published studies, I saw widespread
agreement among courts that they were supposed to confirm arbitration awards. I
share a sample of representative quotes from these courts:
* The arbiter was chosen to be the Judge. That Judge has spoken.
There it ends. 99
* [A]rbitration does not provide a system of "junior varsity trial
courts."'0
* Judicial review of arbitration awards is tightly limited; perhaps it
ought not to be called "review" at all.o10
* The parties to this action voluntarily entered into an arbitration
agreement and further agreed that two arbitrators would decide the
dispute.... Simply being dissatisfied with the results is not a good
reason for setting aside the award.102
* This expectation of finality strongly informs the parties' choice of an
arbitral forum over a judicial one. The arbitrator's decision should
be the end, not the beginning, of the dispute. 03
* [M]aximum deference is owed to the arbitrator's decision and the
standard of review of arbitration awards is among the narrowest
known to law.10
99. McClure v. Montgomery County Cmty. Action Agency, No. 4798, 1975 WL 181652 (Ohio Ct.
App., Nov. 7, 1975).
100. Williams v. Katten, Muchen & Zavis, No. 92 C 5654, 1996 WL 717447 at *6 (N.D. Ill., Dec. 9,
1996) (quoting Eljer Mfg., Inc., v. Kowin Development Corp., 14 F.3d 1250, 1254 (7th Cir. 1994)).
101. See Baravati, supra note 40, at 706.
102. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Deislinger, 711 S.W.2d 771, 772 (Ark. 1986).
103. Moncharsh v. Heily & Base, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 183, at 187 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
104. Durkin v. CIGNA Property & Cas. Corp., 986 F.Supp. 1356, 1358 (D. Kan. 1997) (quoting
ARW Exploration Corp. v. Aguirre, 45 F.3d 1455, 1462-63 (10th Cir. 1995)).
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* Once parties bargain to submit their disputes to the arbitration sys-
tem (a system essentially structured without due process, rules of
procedure, rules of evidence, or any appellate procedure), we are dis-
inclined to save them from themselves. 05
* Judicial intrusion is restricted to the extraordinary situations indicat-
ing abuse of arbitral power or exercise of power beyond the jurisdic-
tion of the arbitrator.10
I highlight these quotes to make our empirical point: beneath the verbal ve-
neer of deferring to arbitration awards, courts vary significantly in their deference
to awards. In FAA cases, there should not be a twenty percentage point difference
in award confirmation between federal and state courts; nor should there be a
similar disparity in federal court review of labor and employment awards. These
results undermine the bedrock principles of a sound legal system-that court rul-
ings should be consistent and predictable. Putting the matter more plainly, most
courts "talk the talk" about deferring to arbitrator awards, but they do not reliably
back up this talk.
B. Forum Shopping to Confirm or Vacate Award
The Supreme Court has recognized a state court's concurrent jurisdiction un-
der the FAA.'0 7 But the results in Table 4 imply that the FAA's procedural flex-
ibility would be subverted as parties race to different courts in order to shop for
the best chance of reviewing an award. In our hypothetical cases, white firefight-
ers would seek FAA review in state court or LMRA review in federal court.
Meanwhile, the employers would seek FAA review in federal district court.
Needless to say, this type of forum shopping would undermine the cornerstone
principles of award finality and efficient resolution of disputes.
Making matters worse, current arbitration law would not settle the forum
shopping problem. The Supreme Court in Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert
Contraction Co. os ruled that a petition to confirm or vacate an award under the
FAA may be filed not only in the district in which the award was made, but also in
any suitable district under general venue provisions. The Court emphasized the
practicality for liberal venue options under the FAA, stating:
The parties may be willing to arbitrate in an inconvenient forum, say, for
the convenience of the arbitrators, or to get a panel with special know-
ledge or experience, or as part of some compromise, but they might well
be less willing to pick such a location if any future court proceedings had
to be held there. Flexibility to make such practical choices, then, could
105. Hawrelak v. Marine Bank, Springfield, 735 N.E.2d 1066, 1070 (111. Ct. App. 2000).
106. Landmark v. Mader Agency, Inc., 878 P.2d 773, 776 (Idaho 1994).
107. See Moses H. Cohen Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 25 (1983) (stating that "the
federal courts' jurisdiction to enforce the [Federal] Arbitration Act is concurrent with that of the state
courts").
108. 529 U.S. 193, 195 (2000).
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well be inhibited by a venue rule mandating the same inconvenient venue
if someone later sought to vacate or modify the award.'0
Our empirical results imply, however, that parties would shop for a venue
simply to improve their odds of winning. Complicating matters even more, courts
have not definitively decided whether an award review action in state court can
rely on the FAA's permissive venue rule." 0
C. Preemption Uncertainty
Many opinions in our databases interchangeably cited FAA and Trilogy stan-
dards. This was not surprising given that both regimes aim to insulate awards
from judicial interference. However, Table 4 implies that there are real differenc-
es in how state and federal-and FAA and LMRA courts-operate.
Penn Plaza will likely bring these latent conflicts to the surface. Specifically,
in hybrid disputes, like those in our hypothetical scenarios, courts will confront
the question: do LMRA standards preempt FAA standards, or do FAA standards
preempt LMRA standards? While it seems clear that the FAA's award review
standards preempt a state counterpart,"' there is no ready answer to this Penn
Plaza preemption question.
Briefly, I explain why federal courts would divide on this issue. The best ar-
gument for ruling that FAA standards preempt the LMRA is that Penn Plaza said
so. Recall that the majority opinion said that "an arbitrator's decision as to
whether a unionized employee has been discriminated against on the basis of age
in violation of the ADEA remains subject to judicial review under the FAA."ll 2
I emphasize the Court's use of unionized employee because the majority opi-
nion appears to acknowledge that it is now displacing labor-management arbitra-
tion into the realm of the FAA. I also believe that since the Penn Plaza ruling
removed the legal boundary between LMRA and FAA arbitration under Gardner-
Denver, some federal courts would conclude that this reasoning clears the way for
FAA preemption of LMRA standards.
However, other federal courts could resist this logic with better arguments.
To begin, Penn Plaza did not decide a complex preemption issue by smuggling its
views on award review in footnote 10's dictum. This footnote may reflect Penn
Plaza's aggressive agenda to undermine collective bargaining, but it did not de-
cide anything. Furthermore, a Trilogy decision, United Steelworkers v. Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co. emphasized that the arbitrator "is rather part of a system of
self-government created by and confined to the parties."" 3  Subordinating the
Trilogy to section 10 of the FAA would corrode the philosophical underpinnings
109. Id. at 201.
I10. See MBNA Am. Bank, N.A. v. Bodalia, 949 So. 2d 935, 939, n.6 (Ala. 2006); Dunigan v. Sports
Champions, Inc., 824 So.2d 720, 721 (Ala. 2001). In both cases state courts held that the restrictive
rules of venue were jurisdictional. Their opinions noted that the parties had not specifically invoked the
FAA.
111. Stephen L. Hayford, Federal Preemption and Vacatur: The Bookend Issues under the Revised
Uniform Arbitration Act, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 67, 75 ("State law cannot conflict with those decision
rules without raising the specter of FAA preemption.").
112. 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1471 n.10 (emphasis added).
113. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960).
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that make labor arbitration a unique institution. Some courts that face the preemp-
tion issue will perceive that Penn Plaza is blind to institutional differences be-
tween LMRA and FAA arbitrations.l14
In sum, the Penn Plaza hypothetical scenarios reveal that the Supreme Court
has created a new hybrid-an arbitration that is part-FAA and part-LMRA. I
believe this landmark ruling will precipitate simmering differences in award vaca-
tur standards under the FAA and LMRA. Professor Stephen Hayford, our co-
panelist at this "creeping legalism" symposium sounded a similar alarm, conclud-
ing that judicial review of commercial arbitration is in a state of disarray.' 15
Penn Plaza, like Gilmer, is oblivious to the growing distinctions between ar-
bitration systems. Penn Plaza also remains uninformed about the recent changes
in the regulation of this ADR process. As more states enact the RUAA, a gulf
grows between the statutory regulation of commercial arbitration and the federal
common law regulation of labor arbitration. And as award review standards proli-
ferate, disputants who are stuck with Penn Plaza hybrid arbitration will find that
their awards are not so final.
114. The Ninth Circuit has some likelihood to appreciate this context. For example, on two occasions
its courts have cited the "self government" passage. See Cannery Warehousemen, Food Processors,
Drivers and Helpers for Teamsters Local Union No. 748 v. Haig Berberian, Inc., 623 F.2d 77, 81 (9th
Cir. 1980); Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Int'l B'hd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union 2294, 600 F.2d 219,
222 (9th Cir. 1979).
115. See Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of Commercial Arbi-
tration Awards, 30 GA. L. REv. 731, 842 (1996), stating:
[Tlhe merits of commercial arbitration awards will be exposed to heightened levels of judicial
scrutiny leading invariably to more frequent vacatur of awards on the nonstatutory grounds. At
that point, the Supreme Court will be obliged to decide the legitimacy of the nonstatutory
grounds for vacatur. Once that issue is squarely placed before the Court, the "other" nonstatutory
grounds, borrowed from the law of labor arbitration, should be rejected as inconsistent with the
public policy articulated in the FAA and in direct conflict with the standards for vacatur clearly
stated in section 10(a) of the Act. Only then will order be restored to the law pertaining to the va-
catur of commercial arbitration awards.
110 [Vol. 2010
22
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2010, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2010/iss1/5
